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387 F.3d 147
United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.
Susan HALLOCK, Ferncliff Associates,
Inc., doing business as Multimedia
Technology Center, Plaintiffs–Appellees,
v.
Robert C. BONNER, Richard Will, Dennis P.
Harrison, Margaret M. Jordan, Thomas Virgilio,
Unknown Named Agents of United States Customs
and Treasury, Unknown Named Agents of United
States Department of Justice, Unknown Named
Agents of United States Postal Service, Unknown
Named Agents of United States Marshals Service,
John & Jane Does 1–25, Defendants–Appellants.

Marrero, District Judge, sitting by designation, filed
concurring opinion.
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[1]

170B Federal Courts
170BXVII Courts of Appeals
170BXVII(C) Decisions Reviewable
170BXVII(C)1 In General
170Bk3274 Finality
170Bk3276 What constitutes finality in general
(Formerly 170Bk584)

Generally, a “final appealable order” is an order
of the district court that ends the litigation on the
merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but
execute the judgment. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291.

No. 03–6221. | Argued: June 7,
2004. | Decided: Oct. 22, 2004.
Synopsis
Background: Corporation and its owner brought Bivens suit
against Treasury Department and Customs agents, alleging
that they intentionally damaged computer equipment that was
seized in investigation. The United States District Court for
the Northern District of New York, David N. Hurd, J., 281
F.Supp.2d 425,denied defendants' motion for judgment on the
pleadings. Defendants appealed.

2 Cases that cite this headnote
[2]

The collateral order doctrine, which allows
certain interlocutory appeals, is an exception to
the rule of finality, generally barring appeals of
non-final orders. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291.

[1] District Court's interlocutory order denying government
defendants' motion was appealable under collateral order
doctrine, and

Affirmed.

Federal Courts
Interlocutory and Collateral Orders
170B Federal Courts
170BXVII Courts of Appeals
170BXVII(C) Decisions Reviewable
170BXVII(C)1 In General
170Bk3277 Interlocutory and Collateral Orders
170Bk3278 In general
(Formerly 170Bk572.1)

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Miner, Circuit Judge, held
that:

[2] for the FTCA judgment bar to apply to a subsequent
Bivens action, the action was required to be a proper one under
the FTCA.

Federal Courts
What constitutes finality in general

Cases that cite this headnote
[3]

Federal Courts
Interlocutory and Collateral Orders
170B Federal Courts
170BXVII Courts of Appeals
170BXVII(C) Decisions Reviewable
170BXVII(C)1 In General
170Bk3277 Interlocutory and Collateral Orders
170Bk3278 In general
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(Formerly 170Bk572.1)

393k1424 Federal Tort Claims Act
(Formerly 393k50.3)

To fit within the collateral order exception to
the rule barring appeals of non-final orders,
the interlocutory order must (1) conclusively
determine the disputed question, (2) resolve an
important issue completely separate from the
merits of the action, and (3) be effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1291.

Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) judgment
bar, providing that a judgment in an FTCA
action is a complete bar to any later action
by reason of the same subject matter, against
the employee of the government whose act
or omission gave rise to the FTCA claim, is
intended to prevent dual recovery from both
the government and its employees and to avoid
the waste of government resources in defending
repetitive suits. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346(b), 2676.

Cases that cite this headnote
[4]

Federal Courts
Judgment on pleadings
170B Federal Courts
170BXVII Courts of Appeals
170BXVII(C) Decisions Reviewable
170BXVII(C)2 Particular Decisions, Matters, or
Questions as Reviewable
170Bk3300 Pleading
170Bk3303 Judgment on pleadings
(Formerly 170Bk576.1)

8 Cases that cite this headnote
[6]

United States
Federal Tort Claims Act
393 United States
393V Employees, Officers, and Agents
393V(D) Liabilities
393V(D)1 In General
393k1422 Existence and Exclusivity of Other
Remedies
393k1424 Federal Tort Claims Act
(Formerly 393k50.3)

District Court's interlocutory order denying
government defendants' motion for judgment on
the pleadings in Bivens suit, on grounds that
related Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) suit
against defendants which was dismissed for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction did not bar Bivens
suit, was appealable, under collateral order
doctrine; order was a conclusive determination
as to whether the FTCA judgment bar derailed
the Bivens action, that issue was completely
separate from merits of the action, and order
would not be effectively reviewable on appeal
from final judgment. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2676;
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 12(b)(1), 28 U.S.C.A.

An action brought under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA) and dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction because it falls within an
exception to the restricted waiver of sovereign
immunity provided by the FTCA does not result
in a “judgment” in an action, for purpose of the
FTCA judgment bar, since that action was not
properly brought under the FTCA in the first
place. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346(b), 2676; Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 12(b)(1), 28 U.S.C.A.
10 Cases that cite this headnote

3 Cases that cite this headnote
[7]
[5]

United States
Federal Tort Claims Act
393 United States
393V Employees, Officers, and Agents
393V(D) Liabilities
393V(D)1 In General
393k1422 Existence and Exclusivity of Other
Remedies

United States
Federal Tort Claims Act
United States
Particular remedies
393 United States
393V Employees, Officers, and Agents
393V(D) Liabilities
393V(D)1 In General
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393k1422 Existence and Exclusivity of Other
Remedies
393k1424 Federal Tort Claims Act
(Formerly 393k50.3)
393 United States
393V Employees, Officers, and Agents
393V(D) Liabilities
393V(D)2 Constitutional Violations; Bivens
Claims
393k1461 Existence and Exclusivity of Other
Remedies
393k1463 Particular remedies
(Formerly 393k50.3)

In an action properly pleaded under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA), a judgment of
dismissal based on the statute of limitations,
laches, release, res judicata, or improper venue
will justify the assertion of the FTCA judgment
bar, providing that a judgment in an FTCA action
is a complete bar to any later action by reason
of the same subject matter, against the employee
of the government whose act or omission gave
rise to the FTCA claim, in a subsequent Bivens
action. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346(b), 2676.

For the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)
judgment bar, providing that a judgment in an
FTCA action is a complete bar to any later action
by reason of the same subject matter, against
the employee of the government whose act or
omission gave rise to the FTCA claim, to apply
to a subsequent Bivens action, the action must
first be a proper one for consideration under the
FTCA, that is, an action for which sovereign
immunity is waived. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346(b),
2676.

13 Cases that cite this headnote

13 Cases that cite this headnote
[8]

Attorneys and Law Firms
*149 Teal Luthy Miller, Attorney, Appellate Staff, Civil
Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington,
D.C. (Barbara L. Herwig, Attorney, Appellate Staff, Civil
Division, United States Department of Justice, Peter D.
Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, United
States Department of Justice, and Glenn T. Suddaby, United
States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, on the
briefs), for Defendants–Appellants.

United States
Federal Tort Claims Act

Kenneth M. Sissel, Esq. (Janise L. Miller, on the brief), for
Plaintiffs–Appellees.

United States
Particular remedies

Before:

393 United States
393V Employees, Officers, and Agents
393V(D) Liabilities
393V(D)1 In General
393k1422 Existence and Exclusivity of Other
Remedies
393k1424 Federal Tort Claims Act
(Formerly 393k50.3)
393 United States
393V Employees, Officers, and Agents
393V(D) Liabilities
393V(D)2 Constitutional Violations; Bivens
Claims
393k1461 Existence and Exclusivity of Other
Remedies
393k1463 Particular remedies
(Formerly 393k50.3)

MINER

and

RAGGI,

MARRERO, District Judge.
*

Circuit

Judges,

and

*

The Honorable Victor Marrero, of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York,
sitting by designation.

Opinion
Judge MARRERO concurs in the majority opinion and in a
separate concurring opinion.
MINER, Circuit Judge.
In this action, defendants-appellants, Robert C. Bonner, 1
Richard Will, Dennis P. Harrison, Margaret M. Jordan,
and Thomas Virgilio, all employees of the United States
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Customs Service, sued along with other, “unknown named”
agents of the United States Customs Service, the United
States Department of the Treasury, the United States
Justice Department, and the United States Marshals Service
(collectively, the “defendants”), appeal from an order entered
in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of New York (Hurd, J.). The action was brought by
plaintiffs-appellees, Susan Hallock and Femcliff Associates,
Inc., d/b/a Multimedia Technology Center (collectively, the
“plaintiffs”), under the authority of Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) [hereinafter
“Bivens ”], for damages arising from the seizure of plaintiffs'
computer equipment in violation of the Fifth Amendment of
the United States Constitution.
1

It appears that Robert C. Bonner, Commissioner of
Customs and Border Protection, did not hold office at the
time of the events that form the subject of this lawsuit.
Since he did not have direct involvement in these events,
he should be dismissed from this action. See Corr. Servs.
Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 72, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151
L.Ed.2d 456 (2001).

The same plaintiffs had invoked the Federal Tort Claims
Act in a previous action brought against the United States
to recover for the same wrongful acts. That action was
concluded by a judgment of dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. The defendants' assertion of that judgment
as a bar to the present action was the basis for the motion
that culminated in the order giving rise to this *150 appeal.
Rejecting the contention that this appeal is taken from a nonappealable interlocutory order, we affirm the determination of
the District Court for reasons somewhat different from those
given by that court.

BACKGROUND
The background of this case, at least for present purposes, is
framed by the allegations of the complaint. Those allegations
must be accepted as true at this stage of the litigation because
defendants have moved for judgment on the pleadings. See
Patel v. Contemporary Classics of Beverly Hills, 259 F.3d
123, 126 (2d Cir.2001). Accordingly, the background facts
that follow are taken from the complaint.

Plaintiff Susan Hallock, who resides with her husband,
Richard Hallock, at 194 Ferncliff Road in the Village of
Mohawk, Herkimer County, New York, is president and sole
stockholder of Ferncliff Associates, Inc., d/b/a Multimedia
Technology Center (“Ferncliff”). The corporate address is
the same as the home address of the Hallocks. On June
8, 2000, defendants Jordan, Virgilio, and Harrison, along
with others, executed at 194 Ferncliff Road a search warrant
issued by the United States District Court for the Northern
District of New York. The warrant authorized seizure of “all
property, contraband, instrumentalities, fruits[,] or evidence
of violation of Title 18, United States Code, § 2252 and
§ 2252A.” The cited statutes proscribe activities relating
to material involving the sexual exploitation of minors and
activities relating to material constituting or containing child
pornography.
Pursuant to the search warrant, defendants seized all computer
equipment, software data, and hard disk drives located at
the Ferncliff Road location. Because of the nature of the
data stored on the hard disk drives, the seizure included “all
Computer Software Intellectual Property, all [C]omputerized
Proprietary Computer Software Design Documents, all
Computerized Personal Records, all Computerized Business
Records, all Computerized Accounts, Client Files and
Business as well as Technological Trade Secrets belonging to
Plaintiffs, both primary and archival backups.”
Apparently, Richard Hallock was the victim of identity theft,
and no evidence of any violation of the cited statutes was
found in the materials seized. In any event, no charge of
any kind was filed against Richard or Susan Hallock, and
the items seized, or what was left of them, were returned to
the plaintiffs on December 21, 2000. Proposed agreements
acknowledging the receipt of the seized items were presented
to the plaintiffs by the United States Attorney for the Northern
District of New York. The proposed agreements included
a representation by Richard Hallock that the data images
in the computers returned were “complete and accurate
reproduction[s]” and had “not been altered.” The agreements
also included a clause whereby Richard Hallock would agree
to save harmless the Customs Service, Treasury and Justice
Departments, and their agents from any claims relating to the
seizure and detention of plaintiffs' property. It appears that
Richard Hallock did not execute the proposed agreements.
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When Richard Hallock received the computer equipment and
hard disk drives on December 21, after the items had been
in the custody of the defendants since June 8, he examined
the equipment and observed that four of the nine computer
systems seized were totally unusable. One of the four was
returned to its owner, a client of Ferncliff Associates, Inc., and
the loss of the other three resulted in the termination of the
plaintiffs' business operations. It also was discovered that five
of the hard *151 disk drives seized were so damaged that all
stored data were lost. Data previously described as included
in the seizure—including documents, records, accounts, files,
and trade secrets—had been stored on the hard drives.
In the complaint that we examine on this appeal, plaintiffs
allege that “[d]efendants intentionally caused total and
permanent damage to the computer equipment resulting in
the complete loss of all stored computer data as well as
loss of computer equipment, all critical to the continued
business operations of [p]laintiffs.” Asserting a violation
of the Fifth Amendment, plaintiffs seek damages in excess
of $4.4 million. The alleged loss and destruction of the
plaintiffs' computer equipment was the subject of a previous
action brought by plaintiffs against the United States of
America under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28
U.S.C. § 1346, and dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. See Hallock v. United States, 253 F.Supp.2d 361
(N.D.N.Y.2003) [hereinafter “Hallock I ”].
In Hallock I, the District Court was confronted with a
complaint in which the plaintiffs put forth claims of negligent
destruction of property, conversion, negligent bailment,
larceny, misfeasance, and personal injury. The FTCA waives
the sovereign immunity of the United States to allow civil
actions
for injury or loss of property, or
personal injury or death caused by
the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment,
under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act
or omission occurred.

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
There are various exceptions to this waiver of sovereign
immunity, and it is the following exception, set forth in 28
U.S.C. § 2680(c), which the District Court was constrained
to apply in Hallock I: “Any claim arising in respect of ... the
detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property by any
officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement
officer ....” Hallock I, 253 F.Supp.2d at 365 (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 2680(c)) (emphasis removed). Rejecting arguments
that the exception applies only to officers performing tax
or custom duties and that plaintiffs' claims arose from the
seizure rather than the detention of goods, the court in Hallock
I granted the motion to dismiss the amended complaint in
accordance with the Government's motion filed pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). In its memorandumdecision and order dated March 21, 2003, the District Court
concluded as follows: “Pursuant to § 2680(c), plaintiffs are
precluded from pursuing their claims under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. All of plaintiffs' claims arise out of the detention
of their property by agents of the United States, and are
therefore barred.” 253 F.Supp.2d at 368. A judgment of
dismissal was entered shortly thereafter. No appeal was taken
from that judgment.
The Bivens action subject of the instant appeal was
commenced while the Government's motion to dismiss
in Hallock I was pending. Here, the plaintiffs joined as
defendants all the government agents and employees alleged
to have been involved in the seizure and detention of
plaintiffs' property. Defendants' motion for judgment on the
pleadings, culminating in Hallock v. Bonner, 281 F.Supp.2d
425 (N.D.N.Y.2003) [hereinafter “Hallock II ”], centered on
the judgment-bar rule found at 28 U.S.C. § 2676. That statute
provides that “[t]he judgment in an action under [the FTCA]
shall constitute a complete bar *152 to any action by the
claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, against the
employee of the Government whose act or omission gave
rise to the claim.” Hallock II, 281 F.Supp.2d at 426 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
In its memorandum-decision and order dated August 19, 2003
in Hallock II denying judgment on the pleadings, the District
Court found a difference between various cases cited for the
proposition that any FTCA judgment precludes a later Bivens
action under the judgment-bar rule and the case at hand,
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where the Bivens action was brought after the filing of an
FTCA action that was dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Id. at 427. Noting defendants' argument “that
there is no limit to the judgment bar and that the moment
any judgment is entered on an FTCA claim a Bivens claims
is precluded,” the District Court opined that “[t]his broad
reading would have the practical effect of foreclosing the
enforcement of substantive rights for no other reason than the
commission of an earlier procedural error.” Id. Rejecting such
a “broad reading,” the District Court in Hallock II concluded
that “plaintiffs' earlier procedural loss [did] not prevent them
from pursuing enforcement of their substantive rights against
the proper defendants.” Id. at 428.
By order dated October 6, 2003, the District Court denied
the defendants' application to certify for appeal, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), its order of August 19. The District
Court found no controlling question of law involving a
substantial basis for difference of opinion, a requirement
for such certification. The rationale for that finding went as
follows: “Defendants have failed to cite even one case—
Circuit or District Court—in which a prior FTCA judgment
dismissing a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
would bar a subsequent Bivens action.” The District Court
added that its finding “would not, of course, bar an appeal as
of right under the collateral order doctrine, if it is applicable.”
This timely appeal, taken by the defendants from the order
denying judgment on the pleadings, followed the denial of
certification.

DISCUSSION
I. Of Appealability
[1] We first address plaintiffs' argument that the order
appealed from is interlocutory and non-final and, therefore,
not appealable in accordance with the statutory provision
conferring upon this Court “jurisdiction of appeals from
all final decisions of District Courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Generally, a final order is an order of the district court that
“ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the
court to do but execute the judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand
v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351
(1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). Clearly, the order
under examination here is not such an order.

There are some narrowly drawn exceptions to the finality
requirement, however. These exceptions allow an appeal to be
taken from an interlocutory order where: (1) the order relates
to injunctions, receiverships, and certain admiralty matters,
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a); (2) the district court has certified for
immediate appeal an order (i) that involves a controlling
question of law, (ii) as to which there exists a substantial
ground for difference of opinion, and (iii) the disposition of
which may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); and (3) the order of the district
court expressly directs the entry of a partial judgment in a
multi-claim or multi-party action upon a determination that
there is no just reason for *153 delay. Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b);
see Kahn v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 91 F.3d 385 (2d
Cir.1996). Here, the order under review does not fit within
any of these three exceptions to the rule of finality.
[2] There is yet a fourth exception to the rule of finality. It
is the so-called “collateral order doctrine” that had its genesis
in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541,
546–47, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). In Cohen, a
stockholder's derivative action was founded on diversity of
citizenship. The defendant corporation sought to apply a state
statute that required certain plaintiffs in such actions to post
a bond as security for court costs. The district court order
there in question held that the statute was not applicable to
the plaintiffs. Holding that order appealable, the Supreme
Court wrote: “This decision appears to fall in that small class
which finally determine claims of right separable from, and
collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to
be denied review and too independent of the cause itself
to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the
whole case is adjudicated.” Id. at 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221.
[3] The collateral order doctrine is said to provide “a narrow
exception to the general rule that interlocutory orders are not
appealable as a matter of right.” Schwartz v. City of New
York, 57 F.3d 236, 237 (2d Cir.1995). “To fit within the
collateral order exception, the interlocutory order must ‘[i]
conclusively determine the disputed question, [ii] resolve an
important issue completely separate from the merits of the
action, and [iii] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a
final judgment.’ ” Whiting v. Lacara, 187 F.3d 317, 320 (2d
Cir.1999) (allowing an appeal from a denial of an attorney's
motion to withdraw as counsel) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand
v. Livesay, 437 U.S. at 468, 98 S.Ct. 2454).
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[4] We conclude that the order under review falls within the
collateral order exception. First, there is no question that the
order constitutes a conclusive determination of the disputed
issue, viz. whether the judgment bar prescribed by Section
2676 derails the Bivens action at bar. Second, that issue is
completely separate and distinct from the merits of the action,
which pertain to the liability of the individual defendants, as
agents of the Government, for their acts and omissions in
regard to the detention of the plaintiffs' goods. Finally, the
order is one that will not be effectively reviewable on appeal
from a final judgment.
The reason that the order will be effectively unreviewable
after final judgment is that Section 2676, which the order
addresses, confers statutory immunity from suit. As in the
case of qualified immunity, the immunity claimed by the
defendants here provides an “entitlement not to stand trial
or face the other burdens of litigation.” Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985).
In short, “ ‘the essence’ of the claimed right is a right not
to stand trial,” Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517,
524, 108 S.Ct. 1945, 100 L.Ed.2d 517 (1988), and an order
adjudicating that right is therefore effectively unreviewable
on appeal, see Murphy v. Reid, 332 F.3d 82, 84 (2d Cir.2003).
While no case in this Circuit is directly on point, the Tenth
Circuit, in a factually analogous context, determined that “all
three prongs of the collateral order doctrine [had been] plainly
satisfied by the district court's holding that Section 2676[did]
not bar [plaintiffs'] Bivens claim.” Farmer v. Perrill, 275 F.3d
958, 961 (10th Cir.2001). We stand with the Tenth Circuit in
that determination. To *154 the extent that Brown v. United
States, 851 F.2d 615, 619 (3d Cir.1988), is to the contrary,
based on the determination that the denial of a Section 2676
judgment bar is not unreviewable on appeal, we reject it.
We also reject plaintiffs' contention that the order here is
not appealable under the collateral order doctrine because
it does not “present a question that is substantial, i.e., not
doomed to failure under controlling precedent.” Lawson v.
Abrams, 863 F.2d 260, 262 (2d Cir.1988). The “doomed to
failure” language applies only to an argument that has been
considered and rejected in a prior case. Here, the application
of the judgment bar to the dismissal of an FTCA claim by
virtue of a statutory exception is a matter of first impression
in this Circuit and, therefore, cannot be described as “doomed
to failure” in either this Court or the District Court.

II. Of the Judgment Bar Provision
[5] The FTCA provides that “[t]he judgment in an action
under section 1346(b) of this title shall constitute a complete
bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of the same
subject matter, against the employee of the government
whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.” 28 U.S.C. §
2676. The bar was intended to prevent dual recovery from
both the Government and its employees and to avoid the
waste of Government resources in defending repetitive suits.
See Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1437–38 (9th
Cir.1994). Moreover, “[s]ince a judgment in an action against
the United States under the FTCA will constitute a [judgment
bar] in favor of the employee whose act gave rise to the
claim,” the rule increases the likelihood “that claims for torts
[will] be made against the United States rather than, as Bivens
suits, against the employee.” Birnbaum v. United States, 588
F.2d 319, 333 (2d Cir.1978). And “[t]hat is as it should be.”
Id. A Government agent should not “be made to suffer alone
an ignominious financial ruin.” Id. Indeed, “[c]ompensation
for incidental harm resulting from the Government's pursuit
of its ... interests is more justly borne by the entire body politic
than by agents of the Government[ ] who, out of [excess] zeal,
exceeded the outer limits of their delegated authority.” Id.
In addition, “Congress ... was concerned about the
[G]overnment's ability to marshal the manpower and finances
to defend subsequent suits against its employees.” See Gasho,
39 F.3d at 1437 (noting that “[t]he prevention of dual
recovery ... is not the only purpose of the statute”). At the
Congressional hearings on the statute, “[o]ne witness testified
that multiple suits imposed a ‘very substantial burden’ on
the [G]overnment.” Id. (quoting Hearings Before the House
Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1942)). Moreover, included in
the legislative history is a statement that “ ‘[i]t is just
and desirable that the burden of redressing wrongs of this
character be assumed by the Government alone within limits,
leaving the employee at fault to be dealt with under the
usual disciplinary controls.’ ” Gilman v. United States, 206
F.2d 846, 848 n. 3 (9th Cir.1953) (quoting S.Rep. No. 1196,
at 5 (1942) (statement of Francis Shea, Assistant Attorney
General)).
In reaching its conclusion that Section 2676 did not apply
in the present context, the District Court drew a distinction
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between cases in which claims are dismissed for a “procedural
error” (as the court characterized a dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under the FTCA) and cases in
which claims are dismissed on the merits. See Hallock II,
281 F.Supp.2d at 427 (citing, e.g., Gasho, 39 F.3d at 1436
(determination on summary judgment), and Farmer, 275 F.3d
at 962 (dismissal *155 pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b))); see
also Rodriguez v. Handy, 873 F.2d 814, 816 (5th Cir.1989)
(FTCA claims determined pursuant to a bench trial); Arevalo
v. Woods, 811 F.2d 487, 488 (9th Cir.1987) (same); Serra v.
Pichardo, 786 F.2d 237, 239 (6th Cir.1986) (FTCA claims
determined in a jury trial). Although the Government cites
Gasho for the proposition that Section 2676 “speaks of
‘judgment’ and suggests no distinction between judgments
favorable and judgments unfavorable to the Government,” 39
F.3d at 1437, the District Court was correct to cite Gasho as
a case decided on the merits.
In Hoosier Bancorp of Indiana, Inc. v. Rasmussen, 90 F.3d
180 (7th Cir.1996), however, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision applying Section 2676 to bar a Bivens
claim on the basis of a prior judgment dismissing an FTCA
claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Circuit Court
“join[ed] the conclusion that any FTCA judgment, regardless
of its outcome, bars a subsequent Bivens action on the same
conduct that was at issue in the prior judgment.” Id. at 185
(internal quotation marks omitted). We do not stand with the
Seventh Circuit in its analysis of the issue before us, nor do we
adopt the District Court's characterization of the dismissal of
plaintiffs' FTCA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
as a “procedural loss.” Hallock II, 281 F.Supp.2d at 428
(“[P]laintiffs' earlier procedural loss does not prevent them
from pursuing enforcement of their substantive rights against
the proper defendants.”).
[6] [7] As we see it, an action brought under the FTCA
and dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because
it falls within an exception to the restricted waiver of
sovereign immunity provided by the FTCA does not result in
a “judgment in an action under section 1346(b) [the Federal
Tort Claims Act].” 28 U.S.C. § 2676. This is so because
the action was not properly brought under the Federal Tort
Claims Act in the first place and is a nullity. We hold that for
the judgment bar to apply, the action must first be a proper
one for consideration under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
In other words, it must fit within the category of cases for
which sovereign immunity has been waived. If it does not,

then a judgment declaring a lack of subject matter jurisdiction
denotes that sovereign immunity has not been waived and that
the case is not justiciable in any event.
[8] We reject the District Court's approach because any
number of procedural defects and/or reasons having nothing
to do with the merits of the claim may justify dismissal of
an action properly brought under the Federal Tort Claims
Act. For example, in an action properly pleaded under the
FTCA, a judgment of dismissal based on the statute of
limitations, laches, release, res judicata, or improper venue
will justify the assertion of the judgment bar in a subsequent
Bivens action. Indeed, even where an involuntary dismissal
without prejudice is ordered pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b),
the judgment entered thereon will constitute a complete bar
if the action was one properly invoking jurisdiction under the
FTCA. Cf. Farmer, 275 F.3d at 963–64.

CONCLUSION
The order of the District Court is affirmed for the foregoing
reasons.

MARRERO, United States District Judge, concurring.
I concur in the holding of the majority opinion, but write
separately to offer alternative grounds for affirmance that I
find more compelling. I would affirm based on *156 the
reasoning of the District Court that a procedurally-based,
rather than merits-based, ruling against a plaintiff on an
FTCA claim does not trigger 28 U.S.C. § 2676's bar against
a subsequent Bivens action.
The majority opinion states that a dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction of a claim brought under the FTCA
does not bar a later Bivens suit because such a claim “was
not properly brought under ” the FTCA and therefore is
a “nullity.” (See supra at 155, emphasis in original.) The
majority also writes that many types of procedural dismissals
of FTCA claims may validly bar subsequent Bivens claims.
Both the majority's reasoning and the alternative approach I
propose read an implied term into § 2676 to give the statute
reasonable meaning; we merely choose to rely upon different
words. The majority's construction finds, before the word
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“under,” an implicit requirement that an action be “properly
brought.” Like the District Court in this case and in two other
precedents cited below, the implied term under the alternative
approach would interpret a requirement of “on the merits”
after the word “judgment” in § 2676.
As the majority opinion correctly notes, the principal
purposes of § 2676 are to prevent double recovery by a
plaintiff from the Government and individual employees, and
to avoid duplicative litigation. A Bivens action brought after
a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction against
an FTCA plaintiff does not present such dangers, 1 but
neither do most other procedurally-based dismissals of FTCA
claims. The majority concludes that certain procedurallybased dismissals of FTCA claims may legitimately bar
subsequent Bivens actions, presumably under § 2676, but that
dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction do not. But
prohibiting a subsequent Bivens action because a plaintiff's
earlier FTCA claim was dismissed by reason of, for instance,
improper venue or laches, would work an unduly harsh result
on that plaintiff. Moreover, to cite another example, one could
argue that an FTCA claim brought after the expiration of the
relevant statute of limitations would be likewise “improperly
brought” under the FTCA and should not bar a subsequent
Bivens suit otherwise timely filed.
1

At most, such a ruling imposes some additional litigation
burdens on the Government.

Significantly, there is no requirement that a Bivens plaintiff
also bring an FTCA claim. Dismissing a Bivens suit because
End of Document

of a good-faith procedural error in a plaintiff's litigation of
an earlier FTCA action—an action that the plaintiff need
not have brought at all to maintain a Bivens claim—does
not advance Congress's goals in enacting § 2676 and unduly
penalizes that plaintiff. To take an extreme example, if a
plaintiff brings a Bivens action and an FTCA claim together
in the same lawsuit and early in the litigation a court were
to dismiss the FTCA claim on procedural grounds such as
lack of proper venue, and not for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, the majority's analysis here would apparently
accept the application of § 2676 to that plaintiff's Bivens suit.
Under the alternative reading I would apply, such a bar would
not require blanket dismissals in every such situation.
I have found only one other district court other than the
District Court in this case that has apparently considered the
precise question before this Court, and that court likewise
ruled in two different opinions that the judgment bar in §
2676 does not block a Bivens suit when a prior FTCA claim
was dismissed on procedural grounds. See *157 Michalik
v. Hermann, 2002 WL 31844910 (E.D.La. Dec.16, 2002);
Michalik v. Hermann, 2002 WL 1870054 (E.D.La. Aug.12,
2002). Thus, while I join the judgment of this Court affirming
the decision of the District Court, I would do so for the reasons
stated above and to be consistent with the rulings of the only
two other courts that have squarely considered this issue.

All Citations
387 F.3d 147
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